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ABSTRACT
Because spaying/neutering animals involves the harming of some 
animals in order to prevent harm to others, some ethicists, like 
David Boonin, argue that the philosophy of animal rights is com-
mitted to the view that spaying/neutering animals violates the re-
spect principle and that Trap Neuter Release (TNR) programs are 
thus impermissible. In response, I demonstrate that the philosophy 
of animal rights holds that, under certain conditions, it is justified, 
and sometimes even obligatory, to cause harm to some animals (hu-
man or nonhuman) in order to prevent greater harm to others. As I 
will argue, causing lesser harm to some animals in order to prevent 
greater harm to others, as TNR programs do, is compatible with the 
recognition of the inherent value of the ones who are harmed. We 
can, and do, spay/neuter cats while acknowledging that they have 
value in their own right.
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Introduction
A fundamental tenet of the philosophy of animal rights is 
that it is wrong to harm beings with inherent value, includ-
ing nonhuman animals, just so that we can “bring about the 
best aggregate consequences for everyone” (Regan 1983, 249). 
While this prohibition on harming individuals with inherent 
value for consequentialist reasons is an attractive element in 
the eyes of deontologists, it nevertheless is said to pose a seri-
ous problem for the philosophy of animal rights when it comes 
to some thorny moral issues, like the problem of animal over-
population (Boonin 2003). David Boonin (2003), for instance, 
takes this prohibition on harming to imply that it is, at least in 
general, impermissible to spay/neuter cats (and dogs). As he 
explains:
After all, when we spay a cat we typically justify our 
act by saying that it is warranted because it will pre-
vent others from suffering, not by claiming that it is in 
the cat’s own interest to be spayed. A common bumper 
sticker advocating spaying and neutering reads simply: 
“There are not enough homes for all of them. Spay or 
neuter your pet,” and I have yet to see one that says 
“sterilize your pets: they’ll be glad you did.” Yet justi-
fying the imposition of costs on one animal by appeal-
ing to the benefits that this imposition will provide to 
others seems to be paradigmatic of the sort of position 
that is ruled out by a rights-based approach, even when 
the others involved are other animals and not human 
beings. (Boonin 2003, 1-2)
Since we intentionally harm individuals with inherent val-
ue to benefit (or prevent harm to) others when we spay/neuter, 
Boonin concludes that the philosophy of animal rights must 
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hold that spaying/neutering animals violates their right to re-
spectful treatment and that it is thus morally impermissible. 
Similarly, Clare Palmer claims that when we “desex” animals, 
we treat them as “instruments, as a means to an end, where the 
end is the good of the whole population or, more frequently, an 
easier life with the owner” (2006, 576). As a nonconsequen-
tialist moral theory that emphasizes the moral importance of 
respecting individuals, it would seem that the philosophy of 
animal rights must condemn the practice of “de-sexing,” i.e., 
spaying/neutering, animals. However, as Boonin predicts, de-
fenders of animal rights likely want to avoid such a commit-
ment.
But is the philosophy of animal rights committed to the 
condemnation of Trap-Neuter Return (TNR) programs, that 
is, programs that capture free-living cats and spay/neuter them 
before releasing them back to where they were found? Assum-
ing that TNR programs effectively stabilize cat populations 
by preventing, or at least combatting, feline overpopulation, I 
argue that the philosophy of animal rights provides resources 
for justifying TNR programs that are directed at managing cat 
populations, even when granting that spay/neuter procedures 
cause net harm to the ones who are spayed/neutered. After re-
viewing what the respect principle both prohibits and requires, 
I conclude that while the respect principle clearly forbids caus-
ing greater harm to (an) individual(s) with inherent value in 
order to avoid causing lesser harms to others, there’s reason 
to think it permits trade-offs that involve the causing of lesser 
harm to prevent greater harm. I moreover illustrate that, under 
certain conditions, the worse-off principle, which is deriva-
tive from the respect principle, requires moral agents to cause 
lesser harm to (an) individual(s) with inherent value in order 
to prevent greater harm to others. Given that TNR programs 
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cause lesser harm to some animals in order to prevent greater 
harm to others, the philosophy of animal rights is committed to 
the view that spaying/neutering cats, under certain conditions, 
is not only permissible, but morally obligatory. 
Preliminary Remarks
The discussion in this article is limited to a moral evalua-
tion of TNR programs that aim at managing only cat popu-
lations. The moral issue of spaying/neutering dogs cannot be 
sufficiently addressed in this article, as this article investigates 
the permissibility of spaying/neutering animals only under the 
conditions in which free-living cats, i.e., cats who spend all or 
a portion of their time outdoors, find themselves. As Jessica 
Pierce notes, it’s problematic to lump together cats and dogs in 
discussions about spay/neuter campaigns because the “popula-
tion dynamics are very different for cats and dogs in the Unit-
ed States” (2016, 157). As she explains, while there are large 
populations of feral cats, there are relatively fewer feral dogs 
(2015, 157). The moral issues surrounding feral cat populations 
are thus distinct from the moral issues surrounding feral dog 
populations, so we ought to consider these issues separately. 
Due to space constraints, I cannot provide an answer in this 
article to the question of whether, or when, it is permissible 
to spay/neuter dogs. Because of this, the following discussion 
about the ethics of spaying/neutering free-living cats ought not 
to be used in an attempt to generate a conclusion about the eth-
ics of spaying/neutering dogs.
While I ultimately conclude that TNR programs that aim 
at managing cat populations are morally required, according 
to the philosophy of animal rights, this does not imply that 
it is permissible for individuals to spay/neuter cats living in 
their homes, provided that these cats lack the opportunity to 
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procreate. Since indoor-only animals who do not have the op-
portunity to procreate do not contribute to the threat of animal 
overpopulation, spaying/neutering these animals would indeed 
violate their rights, provided that Boonin (2003) is right that 
spaying/neutering is an all-things-considered harm to the ones 
who undergo either of these procedures. When an individual 
spays/neuters an animal in order to turn the animal into a better 
or “more amenable companion,” that individual expresses an 
attitude of instrumentalism, which is categorically forbidden 
by the philosophy of animal rights (Palmer 2006, 576). 
Respectful Treatment and the Prima Facie Duty 
not to Harm
To get his animal rights theory off the ground, Regan postu-
lates the notion of inherent value, which is said to be a distinc-
tive kind of value possessed equally by all experiencing sub-
jects-of-a-life (humans and nonhumans), that is, beings who 
“have beliefs and desires, who perceive, remember, and can act 
intentionally, who have a sense of the future, including their 
own future (i.e., are self-aware or self-conscious), who have an 
emotional life, who have a psychophysical identity over time, 
who have a certain kind of autonomy (namely, preference-au-
tonomy), and who have an experiential welfare” (Regan 1983, 
153). According to Regan, we can be confident that conscious 
mammals (human and nonhuman) over the age of one are ex-
periencing subjects-of-a-life and that they thus have inherent 
value. 
To say that a being has inherent value is to say that the being 
has value that is distinct from and incommensurate with the in-
trinsic value of that being’s experiences, like pleasures or pref-
erence satisfactions (Regan 1983, 235). An individual who has 
inherent value has value in-and-of-herself, which means that 
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she has value even if she has no intrinsically valuable experi-
ences and even if her existence provides no benefit to others. 
The respect principle, which rests on the postulate of inherent 
value, demands that we treat individuals with inherent value 
“in ways that respect their inherent value” (Regan 1983, 248). It 
is a matter of strict justice that individuals are given their due, 
and what they are due is equal respect of their inherent value. 
Individuals with inherent value thus have a fundamental right 
to respectful treatment, and all moral agents are said to possess 
a fundamental duty to treat those who possess inherent value 
with respect (Regan 2003, 68). The right to respectful treat-
ment is not just fundamental; it is also absolute, as we are never 
justified in ignoring or overriding this right (Regan 1983, 286).
Regan’s account of respect borrows the Kantian idea that 
we cannot treat those with inherent value as “mere means to 
securing best aggregate consequence” (Regan 1983, 249). In 
describing how moral agents violate the respect principle, Re-
gan explains:
[W]e fail to treat individuals who have inherent value 
with the respect they are due, as a matter of strict jus-
tice, whenever we treat them as if they lacked inherent 
value, and we treat them in this way whenever we treat 
them as if they were mere receptacles of valuable ex-
perience (e.g., pleasure or preference satisfaction) or as 
if their value depended upon their utility relative to the 
interests of others. (Regan 1983, 248) 
This passage implies that there are two different ways in 
which we might treat individuals with inherent value as mere 
means, thereby violating the respect principle: when we treat 
them as “mere receptacles of value, lacking any value in them-
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selves” (Regan 1983, 259), or when we treat them as “having 
value only relative to the interests of others” (Regan 1983, 345). 
In other words, we fail to treat experiencing subjects-of-a-life 
with the respect they are due when we treat them as mere re-
ceptacles or as resources.
Regan explains that we treat individuals with inherent value 
as mere receptacles when “their goods (e.g., their pleasures) 
and their harms (e.g., pains) are viewed as being directly mor-
ally relevant to the determination of what ought to be done,” 
yet the harm done to them is assumed to be justified if “the 
best” aggregate consequences are produced (Regan 1983, 345). 
For instance, a Utilitarian might view rodeo animals to be mere 
receptacles when, in their moral deliberations about the per-
missibility of rodeos, they acknowledge that the pain and suf-
fering of rodeo animals is morally relevant, but they neverthe-
less go on to conclude that it is permissible to harm animals in 
rodeos, provided that rodeos produce a significant amount of 
pleasure for rodeo-viewers and that this aggregate of pleasure 
experienced by rodeo-goers “outweighs” the pain caused to the 
relatively few animals used in rodeos.
We also violate the respect principle when we treat individu-
als with inherent value as resources, which occurs when we 
treat individuals “as if their value depended upon their utility 
relative to the interests of others” (Regan 1983, 248). When we 
treat individuals as resources or things, we assume that “their 
goods and their harms can have no direct moral significance,” 
essentially reducing them to the status of things (Regan 1983, 
345). We not only find it permissible to harm individuals in 
order to bring about the best aggregate consequences, but we 
also treat the harm inflicted upon them as morally insignifi-
cant. Later in The Case, Regan points out that our society often 
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treats nonhuman animals not just as resources, but as renew-
able resources. Take factory farmed animals, for example. We 
treat these animals as resources because we assume that their 
value is “contingent upon their utility relative to the interests of 
others,” and we treat them as renewable because we treat them 
as replaceable; after we kill them, we replace them with other 
similar beings. And as Regan notes, to treat or view animals as 
renewable resources is to view them “as even less than mere 
receptacles,” and thus “it is an even greater injustice” to treat 
animals like renewable resources (Regan 1983, 345). 
Whether we treat an experiencing subject-of-a-life as a mere 
receptacle of value or as a resource, we treat the being as a mere 
means, thereby violating the respect principle. So, we must ask: 
in what sense do we allegedly violate the respect principle when 
we spay/neuter cats? To state the obvious, we certainly do not 
treat cats who are spayed/neutered as resources, as we do not 
act as if the harms that cats endure through the spay/neuter 
process lack moral significance. After all, one priority of a vet-
erinarian is to minimize the pain and suffering experienced 
by those who are spayed/neutered. For instance, animals are 
under anesthesia when they are spayed/neutered, even though 
it would be cheaper to perform these procedures without using 
anesthesia. Those who request that a veterinarian spay/neuter 
an animal would be morally outraged if they learned that the 
veterinarian withheld pain relief to the animals on whom they 
operate. Moreover, cats who are spayed/neutered by TNR pro-
grams are released back to the location where they were found 
so that they can go on to enjoy the remainder of their lives. The 
reason why animal protection agencies opt for spaying/neuter-
ing cats instead of killing them is because they recognize that 
the lives of cats are valuable and that the goods they might 
experience are morally significant. So if spaying/neutering in-
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volves a rights violation, the violation must occur because the 
ones who are spayed/neutered are treated not as resources, but 
as mere receptacles. In what follows, I argue that although cats 
who are spayed/neutered are harmed in order to prevent harm 
to others, TNR programs do not violate the respect principle, 
as those who are spayed/neutered are not treated as mere recep-
tacles. In support of this claim, I begin by providing a detailed 
review of Regan’s account of both impermissible and permis-
sible harms, which will clarify what it means to treat someone 
as a mere receptacle. 
Impermissible Harms & Aggregative 
Computations
The respect principle imposes the harm principle, which de-
clares a prima facie duty not to treat individuals with inherent 
value in ways that detract from their welfare (Regan 1983, 262). 
According to the philosophy of animal rights, it follows that 
we have a prima facie negative duty not to harm individuals 
with inherent value, and individuals with inherent value have a 
prima facie right not to be harmed. But it does not follow that 
we ought never to harm individuals with inherent value. After 
all, not every instance of harming constitutes a rights violation. 
The philosophy of animal rights thus acknowledges that the 
right not to be harmed is not absolute, and thus it can be over-
ridden by competing moral concerns. 
To determine if a given harm constitutes unjust treatment, 
we must ask whether the one who is harmed is treated disre-
spectfully. And to determine this, we must consider the reason 
why the harm is produced. As John Atwell suggests, an agent’s 
attitudes are relevant in determining if she has treated another 
disrespectfully (Atwell 1986, 112). The philosophy of animal 
rights, too, is concerned not just with disrespectful treatment, 
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but also with disrespectful attitudes. It holds that we fail to act 
in accordance with the respect principle when we treat or view 
an individual with inherent value merely as a mere receptacle 
of what has value or as a resource (Regan 1983, 249). As R.S. 
Downie and Elizabeth Telfer note, “if a person has a certain 
attitude towards something he will necessarily adopt certain 
principles of action towards it other things being equal, and the 
general nature of the principles can be inferred from knowl-
edge of the attitude” (Downie and Telfer 1970, 16). Likewise, 
the philosophy of animal rights holds that we can determine 
whether a harmer violates the respect principle by evaluating 
his attitude toward the one he harms and by considering his 
reason for causing the harm.
While, under certain conditions, the injunction against 
harming individuals with inherent value can be permissi-
bly overridden, the rights view holds that it is impermissible 
to cause harm “on the grounds that all those affected by the 
outcome will thereby secure “the best” aggregate balance of 
intrinsic values (e.g., pleasures) over intrinsic disvalues (e.g., 
pains)” (Regan 1983, 286). When we harm individuals with 
inherent value in order to produce optimal consequences for 
all concerned, we treat them like mere receptacles, failing to 
treat them with the respect they are due (Regan 1983, 249, 261, 
277, 393). Thus, what the injunction against viewing or treat-
ing individuals with inherent value as mere receptacles implies 
is a prohibition on harming individuals with inherent value in 
order to produce optimific results for all those affected by the 
outcome.
The philosophy of animal rights thus rejects the minimize 
harm principle, which is the consequentialist principle that 
says when we are in a situation that presents us with options 
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that all produce some amount of harm to innocent others, we 
ought to choose the option that produces the least total sum of 
harm (Regan 1983, 302). Consider the following hypothetical 
scenario that is entertained by Regan, which provides us with 
three choices:
We may harm A quite radically, or we may harm a 
thousand others in a modest way, or we may do noth-
ing, in which case both A and the thousand will be 
harmed as described. Suppose we could place numeri-
cal values on the harms in question. A’s harm equals, 
say, -125; the aggregate of the thousand, each of whom 
will be harmed at a value of -1, is -1,000; and the ag-
gregate of both, then, is -1,125. (Regan 1983, 302)
In this situation, which alternative should we choose, asks 
Regan? If we use the minimize harm principle to answer this 
question, we will find that we ought to harm A. Yet, as Regan 
declares, “that seems grossly unfair” (Regan 1983, 302). The 
quality of the life of A “would be in shambles” if we choose 
that option, whereas the welfare of the thousand others would 
be only modestly diminished if we opted for harming them 
(Regan 1983, 302). What we ought to do, says Regan, is spare 
A gross harm and spread the harm around by choosing to harm 
the thousand. The assumption here seems to be that the mini-
mize harm principle is not a valid moral principle because the 
philosophy of animal rights forbids causing greater harm to 
(an) individual(s) with inherent value in order to avoid caus-
ing lesser harms to others that, when aggregated, “outweigh” 
the greater harm. The philosophy of animal rights forbids this 
type of trade-off because when we cause great harm to an in-
dividual just to prevent lesser harms to others that, when ag-
gregated, outweigh the harm caused to the one, we treat the 
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harmed one, at the very least, as a receptacle of what has value. 
The individual is assumed to have no value of her own; she 
can be harmed greatly or altogether destroyed if this prevents 
a number of lesser harms to others that, when added together, 
“outweigh” her losses. 
Regan writes elsewhere that we cannot justify causing seri-
ous harm to a cow just because others would receive relatively 
trivial culinary rewards from killing, cooking, and eating the 
cow. As he explains, even if, after we add up the total culinary 
benefits that might be produced by killing and eating a cow, we 
find that the total benefits greatly outweigh anything the cow 
has been made to endure, it would still be impermissible to 
kill and eat a cow because, as Regan puts it, we cannot justify 
“imposing a prima facie greater harm on a given individual if 
the aggregate of the lesser harms done to others happens to out-
weigh the total harm done to the individual” (Regan 1983, 336). 
This discussion lends further support to the view that what is 
fundamentally wrong with using aggregative computations is 
that this kind of moral mathematics permits moral agents to 
cause greater harm to one individual in order to avoid causing 
lesser harms to others that, when added together, “outweigh” 
the greater harm imposed upon the individual. 
The prior discussion in this section demonstrates that the 
respect principle categorically forbids at least one specific 
type of trade-off: a trade-off that causes greater harm to (an) 
individual(s) with inherent value in order to avoid causing 
lesser harms to (or to modestly improve the welfare of) others. 
But this does not imply that all trade-offs are impermissible. 
So if we are to use Regan’s discussion of the respect principle 
to definitively claim that TNR programs are impermissible on 
the rights view, it must be the case that TNR programs cause 
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greater harm to some animals in order to spare others lesser 
harms (or to moderately improve the welfare of others). But 
this isn’t what happens when TNR practices are implemented. 
Rather, as I will later demonstrate, TNR programs cause lesser 
harm to some animals in order to prevent greater harm to oth-
ers. Indeed, the aim of TNR programs is to reduce the serious 
harms that invariably accompany overpopulation, such as fe-
rality, hunger, lack of shelter, ill-health, and premature death. 
Yet in his discussion of the respect principle, Regan does not 
claim that it is wrong to cause lesser harm to individuals with 
inherent value in order to prevent greater harm to others. Con-
sequently, it’s possible that the philosophy of animal rights, as 
it is described by Regan, rejects the view that TNR programs 
are impermissible.
The Worse-Off Principle, Comparable Harm, and 
Permissible Harms
In the previous section, I argued that Regan’s discussion of 
the respect principle can’t be used to definitively say that TNR 
programs are impermissible. Regan’s discussion of the respect 
principle is limited to a discussion about a particular type of 
trade-off where (an) individual(s) is harmed in order to prevent 
lesser harms to others, and TNR practices do not involve this 
type of trade-off. But, one might ask, what about trade-offs 
that involve the causing of lesser harm to some in order to pre-
vent greater harm to others? Perhaps this type of trade-off also 
violates the respect principle, even though Regan did not ex-
plicitly say so. Consequently, it still could be the case that TNR 
programs involve a type of trade-off that is also forbidden by 
the philosophy of animal rights. 
In response, I argue that Regan’s conception of animal rights 
holds that, under certain circumstances, it is obligatory to cause 
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harm to (an) individual(s) with inherent value in order to avoid 
causing greater harms to others, and this implies that TNR pro-
grams are not only permissible, but obligatory. Indeed, the phi-
losophy of animal rights does not claim that whenever we harm 
an individual in order to prevent harm to others, we treat the 
individual like a mere receptacle of value, lacking any value 
in her own right. Quite the contrary, the philosophy of ani-
mal rights endorses moral principles that sanction the harm-
ing of some individuals with inherent value in order to prevent 
greater harm to others, under certain conditions. For instance, 
the liberty principle holds that “any innocent individual has 
the right to act to avoid being made worse-off even if doing so 
harms other innocents,” so long as the respect principle is not 
violated, which implies that the respect principle is compatible 
with the view that, under certain conditions, it’s permissible to 
harm others in order to benefit another (in this case, the self) 
(Regan 1983, 331). Moreover, the philosophy of animal rights 
acknowledges that some trade-offs are not only permissible, 
but obligatory. Consider the moral guidance offered by the 
worse-off principle, which, according to Regan, is derivable 
from the respect principle:
Worse-off principle: Special considerations aside, 
when we must decide to override the rights of the many 
or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when 
the harm faced by the few would make them worse-
off than any of the many would be if any other option 
were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of 
the many. (Regan 1983, 308)
The worse-off principle applies in “prevention cases,” which 
refer to situations in which, “no matter what we decide to do—
and even if we decide to do nothing—an innocent subject-of-
Cheryl Abbate
108
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 21, Issue 1
a-life will be harmed” (Regan 1983, xxviii). In a prevention 
case that involves incomparable harms, Regan claims that we 
ought to choose to cause the lesser harm in order to avoid mak-
ing some worse-off than others, even if this results in harming 
“the many.” But, as Regan insists, we should not appeal to an 
“aggregative computation” to justify the harm that we might 
impose upon another. That is, our reason for causing harm 
should never be that the aggregated consequences of making 
this choice would be better. Rather, when it comes to preven-
tion cases that involve unequal harms, we ought to settle the 
conflicts by appealing to the notion of comparable harm. 
In defense of the worse-off principle, Regan writes:
To say that two individuals, M and N, have an equal 
right not to be harmed, based on the equal respect each 
is owed, does not imply that each and every harm ei-
ther may suffer is equally harmful. Other things being 
equal, M’s death is a greater harm than N’s migraine. If 
we are to show equal respect for the value and rights of 
individuals, therefore, we cannot count a lesser harm 
to N as equal to or greater than a greater harm to M.  
To show equal respect for the equal rights of the two, 
one must count their equal harms equally, not their un-
equal harms equally, a requirement that entails, other 
things being equal in prevention cases, that M’s right 
override N’s when the harm to M would be greater if 
one choice were made than the harm done to N would 
be if another option were chosen. (Regan 1983, 309)
Regan’s claim is that when there is a prevention case that 
involves unequal harms, those who are vulnerable to greater 
harms ought not to be harmed. As he explains, “[i]t is not the 
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aggregate balance of goods and evils for all those affected by 
the outcome that is decisive; it is the magnitude of the harm 
done to the individuals directly involved that is” (Regan 1983, 
314). In determining whether it is justified to inflict harm upon 
an individual with inherent value, we ought to evaluate the 
magnitude of the harm and compare the seriousness of the 
harm to the other relevant harms, but we ought not to consider 
the aggregate consequences in this decision. Thus, when we 
have a choice between two or more options that all cause harm 
to innocent others and one of these options will make (an) 
individual(s) worse-off than the others, then we must not cause 
the harm that makes (an) individual(s) worse-off than the oth-
ers (Regan 1983, 313). In prevention cases, we ought to cause 
the lesser harm. 
As Alan Clune rightly notes, Regan intended for the worse-
off principle to be used in “true-life boat cases,” that is, cases 
that involve a group of individuals who “naturally share equal-
ly in a set of threatening circumstances, as opposed to being 
purposely placed in such circumstances” (Clune 1996, 35). On 
Regan’s view, in order for a conflict to be characterized as a 
prevention or life-boat case, two conditions must obtain. First, 
none of the parties in the conflict situation can be “involved” in 
the conflict just because their rights were violated. That is, none 
of the parties can be there “as a result of being treated with a 
lack of respect” (Regan 1983, xxxi). Second, the individuals in-
volved just “happen” to find themselves in a situation where all 
will be harmed if some action is not taken (Regan 1983, xxxi). 
Given these conditions, animal exploitation, including animal 
research, cannot be justified on the grounds that it is a type of 
“prevention case.” First, animals used for biomedical research 
are purposely placed in research labs. Mice do not just wander 
into a researcher’s lab, forcing researchers to choose between 
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killing a mouse and saving a child with disease. Second, it’s 
not the case that everyone involved in the biomedical research 
“conflict” will be harmed if some action is not taken. Indeed, 
the research subjects would do quite well if action is not taken, 
that is, if the researchers altogether refrained from experiment-
ing on them. Setting aside exploitative environments, where 
“conflicts” are artificially constructed due to a violation of 
rights, every time we are in a situation where we can harm 
one to prevent harm to others, we are possibly in a “life-boat” 
predicament. 
An Impurrfect Lifeboat 
From Regan’s discussion of prevention cases and the worse-
off principle, it’s clear that the philosophy of animal rights im-
plies the following: 
When we find ourselves in a prevention case where we 
can prevent greater harm to (an) individual(s) by caus-
ing lesser harm to another individual(s), we ought to 
do so. 
This, in turn, implies that we ought to spay/neuter free-liv-
ing cats, as TNR programs do. As I will argue in this section, 
the situation involving free-living cats and the threat of animal 
overpopulation qualifies as a prevention case and, moreover, 
TNR programs prevent greater harm to some free-living cats 
by causing lesser harm to others. As I proceed, I assume that 
spaying/neutering is the least harmful way of managing effec-
tively cat populations, although later I consider the possibility 
of using less harmful sterilization procedures and the moral 
imperative of pursuing such alternatives in lieu of the standard 
spay/neuter operations employed in the United States today. 
However, since we lack sufficient evidence that these alterna-
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tives are equally effective at managing cat populations, I grant 
that it is morally responsible to assume, until further research 
is conducted, that the best available method of sterilizing ani-
mals is spaying/neutering. But even so, TNR programs still 
ought to investigate the possibility of less harmful alternatives.
When it comes to the question of how we ought to approach 
the moral issue surrounding free-living cats and the threat of 
overpopulation they face, we have two choices: first, we can 
cause harm to some of them by spaying/neutering them in or-
der to manage populations, or we can do nothing and permit 
cat populations to proliferate, which inevitably will lead to an 
increase of serious harms that many, if not all, free-living cats 
will endure, including illness, starvation, territorial conflicts, 
and premature death. Yet, one might claim that domestication 
is unjust, and thus domesticated animals are, by default, vic-
tims of injustice, and, consequently, free-living cats are party 
to the conflict as a consequence of having their rights violated. 
As Kylmicka and Donaldson claim, “domestication has been 
characterized by the coercive confinement, manipulation, and 
exploitation of animals for the benefit of humans” (2011, 73). 
The objection, then, is that since free-living felines are alleged-
ly party to the conflict because they have been treated unjustly, 
the situation involving free-living felines does not constitute a 
prevention case.
Even if we grant that the human domestication of animals is 
always unjust, it does not follow from this that free-living cats 
who were conceived thousands of years after the domestica-
tion process took place have had their rights violated merely 
in virtue of being conceived by another domesticated animal 
or in virtue of being descendants of animals who were, at one 
point, allegedly treated unjustly. Moreover, there’s evidence 
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that, in some sense, cats domesticated themselves, choosing to 
live with humans thousands of years ago, and thus the original 
domestication of cats is said to have happened without coer-
cion, as cats likely were willing participants in the domestica-
tion process. After all, thousands of years ago, cats voluntarily 
entered human farming spaces during the period of agricul-
tural development and they soon developed what some would 
say is a mutually beneficial relationship with humans (Driscoll 
et al., 2007). Farmers provided cats, who entered human agri-
cultural spaces in an effort to hunt and eat the rodents living 
on farms, with warmth and food in exchange for keeping the 
rodent population in check. This marked the beginning of the 
feline-human relationship, which was centered around food, 
and the beginning of feline domestication. It’s thus likely that 
feline domestication was unintentional and, moreover, that the 
domestication of felines does not signify injustice. 
While cat breeders violate the rights of cats when they im-
prison them and often times forcibly impregnate them, the 
majority of free-living cats alive today are not the victims of 
kitten mills or breeders. But should we come across free-living 
cats who we have good reason to believe are victims of forced 
breeding, we ought to refrain from spaying/neutering these an-
imals given their potential status as victims of injustice. How-
ever, even if morality demands that we refrain from spaying/
neutering these animals if doing so is not for their own good, 
this does not entail that it’s impermissible to spay/neuter cats 
who haven’t been treated unjustly, which seems to be the case 
for the majority of free-living cats.
In understanding how the situation involving free-living fe-
lines constitutes a prevention case, we ought to further bear in 
mind that currently existing cats face the dangers that accom-
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pany overpopulation. If we ceased TNR practices today, many, 
if not all, free-living cats who currently exist will themselves 
endure the negative impacts of overpopulation. For instance, 
ceasing spay/neuter operations will, in the lifetime of currently 
existing cats, lead to enlarged feral cat communities, and thus 
an increase in disease, hunger, and conflicts over territory and 
food, all of which are seriously harmful. Moreover, some of 
the cats who currently exist will face the harm of premature 
death because, given that many unwanted feral cats end up in 
animal shelters, kill-shelters will increase the number of cats 
they kill as intake increases due to the rise of feral cat popula-
tions. Currently, in the United States alone, animal shelters kill 
2.4 million healthy cats and dogs each year in order to prevent 
overpopulation (Humane Society of the United States 2017). If 
the number of free-living cats increases, wildlife agencies, like 
the American Bird Conservancy, will insist that more feral cats 
be taken to local animal shelters. And, as Julie Levy and Cynda 
Crawford suggest, “a large influx of feral cats removed from 
the environment would crowd shelters and increase euthanasia 
of both feral and friendly homeless cats” (2004, 1357). Essen-
tially, an increase in free-living cats leads to an increase in shel-
ter intake and, ultimately, an increase in feline-killing. We can 
only expect that the first to be killed in shelters are those who 
are “less adoptable,” including older feral cats who are difficult 
to socialize, that is, the very animals who were alive at the time 
the decision was made to halt spay-neuter practices. This is to 
say that currently existing cats are “at risk” from the serious 
harms that stem from overpopulation. Consequently, when we 
spay/neuter, we do not “transfer” risk that future existing cats 
will face in a world without trap-spay-neuter release programs 
to the current population of cats. Cats who exist at this moment, 
themselves, face the risk of serious harm that would manifest 
in a world without spay-neuter programs. 
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Because TNR programs reduce the number of cats ending 
up in overloaded, high-kill shelters, a large-scale TNR effort is 
a core and effective strategy for reducing the number of healthy 
animals killed in shelters (Levy and Crawford 2004). For in-
stance, in 2011, the County of Santa Clara’s Animal Care & 
Control Division reported that their TNR program caused a 
15% reduction in cat intake and a 65% reduction in cat eutha-
nasia (County of Santa Clara 2012) and, throughout the U.S., 
counties that have implemented TNR programs report a simi-
lar decline in shelter killing. These findings explain why TNR 
programs are rightly described as alternatives to trap-and-kill 
methods of controlling feline populations, which would harm 
seriously felines living today in the absence of TNR programs. 
Given what’s been argued, we ought to conclude that the sit-
uation involving free-living cats qualifies as a prevention case. 
So the question we must ask is this: are the harms produced by 
overpopulation greater than the harms produced by spay/neu-
ter procedures? As Boonin notes, animals who are spayed/neu-
tered experience a number of nontrivial harms, such as anxiety, 
fear, and terror when they are transported and exposed to the 
unfamiliar environment at the veterinarian’s office, and general 
disorientation, nausea, and physical discomfort, which last for 
several days after the spay/neuter procedure (2003). Moreover, 
animals who are spayed/neutered might be subject to depriva-
tional harm. While, as Palmer points out, “[w]e cannot know 
whether de-sexing matters to a cat or dog, and if it does, how 
much and in what ways,” it is possible that the pursuit and act 
of sex, along with the experience of carrying and raising off-
spring, are enjoyable for cats (2006, 576). Bernard Rollin, for 
one, speculates that animals “probably enjoy sexual congress 
as much as we do” (2006, 305). There’s good reason to think 
that Boonin is right in claiming that if there are any benefits 
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to the animals who are spayed/neutered, such as the alleged 
reduced risk of breast cancer, these benefits do not outweigh 
the costs imposed upon them.
Perhaps, then, it is the case that because spaying/neuter-
ing both causes a series of physical harms and denies the ones 
who are spayed/neutered potential sources of satisfaction, such 
procedures cause non-trivial harm. But even if this is so, the 
harms that free-living cats face in a world without population 
management, especially the harm of premature death, are ar-
guably greater. While spaying/neutering may deprive animals 
of various opportunities for satisfaction, death is the ultimate 
harm because it deprives the one who dies of all opportuni-
ties for satisfaction (Regan 1983). Anyone who lives with a 
spayed/neutered cat can attest to the fact that desexed cats go 
on to enjoy a wide array of satisfactions and that their lives are 
certainly worth living. Because of this, if we have a choice to 
spay/neuter them or kill them (or allow them to die), we cer-
tainly ought to opt for spaying/neutering them, for their own 
sake. When it comes to the moral predicament surrounding 
free-living felines, we are faced with a choice between causing 
the lesser harm of spaying/neutering or permitting the prolif-
eration of overpopulated feral cat communities, where disease, 
malnutrition, conflict, and premature death run rampant. The 
life-boat logic implies that we ought to cause the lesser harm of 
spaying/neutering, rather than allow the tragic and more seri-
ous harm of overpopulation to materialize. 
Now that we have a better understanding of what type of 
harm is impermissible and what type of harm is permissible, 
according to the rights view, let us return to the claim that the 
philosophy of animal rights implies that spaying/neutering ani-
mals is categorically wrong. Boonin argues that in defense of 
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the practice of spaying/neutering animals, “[t]he benefits we 
appeal to are simply those which follow from reducing the 
population of unwanted animals: less overall suffering” (Boo-
nin 2003, 2). But, as he continues, “if cats and dogs have the 
right to respectful treatment, then these benefits cannot provide 
a moral warrant for our behavior” (Boonin 2003, 2). The as-
sumption here is that when we spay/neuter animals, we harm 
individuals just so that we can “bring about the best aggregate 
consequences for everyone” (Regan 1983, 249). 
Let us assume that it is true that the animals who are spayed/
neutered are harmed and that the harm inflicted upon them is 
not for their own sake, but to prevent harm to others. And let us 
assume that it is true that the aggregate of harm that will result 
when cats are spayed/neutered is less serious than that would 
result if we allow the harm of overpopulation to manifest. We 
still cannot move from either the claim that spaying/neuter-
ing cats reduces aggregate harm or the claim that cats who are 
spayed/neutered are harmed in order to prevent harm to others 
to the claim that spaying/neutering constitutes a violation of 
the respect principle. As I’ve demonstrated, it is not the case 
that every time we harm some individuals to prevent harm 
to others, we use an aggregative computation to justify that 
harm. Sometimes, we appeal to the notion of comparable harm. 
Moreover, when it comes to prevention cases, the philosophy of 
animal rights requires moral agents to harm (an) individual(s) 
with inherent value in order to prevent greater harm to others. 
We cannot, then, conclude that spaying/neutering cats is wrong 
just because it involves the harming of some animals in order 
to prevent harm to others. Regan’s discussion of the worse-off 
principle and prevention cases implies that there is a moral im-
perative to implement TNR practices, when doing so is needed 
to manage effectively free-living cat populations.  
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Serious Harms and Basic Rights
While the argument in the previous section appeals to Re-
gan’s claim that in prevention cases, we ought to cause lesser 
harm to some in order to prevent greater harm to others, the 
discussion that follows proposes that instead of thinking in 
terms of “lesser” and “greater” harms, we think in terms of 
“basic” and “non-basic” interests and rights. After all, the dis-
cussions surrounding the respect principle, the minimize harm 
principle, and the worse-off principle imply that we treat an 
individual with inherent value like a mere receptacle when we 
sacrifice what Henry Shue refers to as an individual’s “basic 
rights” in the name of another’s non-basic interests.
Shue explains that rights are basic insofar as “enjoyment of 
them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights… basic 
rights are the morality of the depths. They specify the line be-
neath which no one is to be allowed to sink” (Shue 1980, 18-19). 
I take basic rights to be rights that protect basic interests and 
non-basic rights to be rights that protect what Donald VanDe-
Veer refers to as “peripheral interests” (1979). While basic in-
terests are those interests that must be satisfied in order for a 
being to function in a “minimally adequate way,” peripheral 
interests are those that allow a creature to thrive in some way 
if they are satisfied, but they aren’t required for minimally ad-
equate functioning. As VenDeVeer notes, peripheral interests 
can be serious or trivial, whereby serious interests are those 
that are not basic, but not frivolous either (1979, 61). Yet even 
though some peripheral interests may be serious, basic inter-
ests are always weightier than all peripheral interests, as basic 
interests are required for “minimally adequate functioning.”
There are three basic rights, says Shue: the rights to subsis-
tence, physical security, and, liberty. Although Regan does not 
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use the language of “basic rights,” his writings indicate that 
he has something similar in mind in The Case. Regan claims 
that rights protect three fundamental goods or vital needs: our 
lives, our bodies, and our freedoms (Regan 2003, 75). It would 
seem, then, that the rights to life, body, and liberty are basic 
for the philosophy of animal rights, too, as the substances of 
these rights are fundamental goods.  Gary Francione, who ad-
vances a theory of animal rights that shares Regan’s abolition-
ist goals, points out that “[i]f animals are to have any rights 
at all (other than merely legalistic or abstract ones to which 
Shue refers), they must have certain basic rights that would 
then necessarily protect them from being used for food, cloth-
ing, or experiments” (2003, 8). It thus seems that the notions 
of “basic rights,” “fundamental goods, and “basic interests” 
have normative force in the philosophy of animal rights. And 
since these notions help clarify what is fundamentally at stake 
in the animal ethics discourse, animal rights theorists ought to 
emphasize that the respect principle implies that it is wrong to 
sacrifice an individual’s fundamental goods or basic rights in 
the name of non-basic goods or non-basic rights. Moreover, 
the philosophy of animal rights ought to make clear that in pre-
vention cases, the worse-off principle requires us to sacrifice 
an individual’s non-basic interests (or non-basic rights) when 
doing so is necessary to preserve the basic interests of another. 
Cats who are spayed/neutered by TNR programs go on to 
enjoy and exercise a wide array of rights, including the right 
to roam about and the right to track and hunt prey. If cats are 
spayed/neutered, it doesn’t follow that, as a consequence of this 
operation, they will be unable to function in a minimally de-
cent way. Although spaying/neutering animals might deprive 
them of the opportunity to thrive in the way that they would 
were they not desexed, these animals are still able to enjoy a 
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good quality of life, as other opportunities for satisfaction re-
main open to them. Since the right not to be spayed/neutered 
does not protect a fundamental good or basic interest, the right 
not to be spayed/neutered should be characterized as non-basic. 
This is not to deny that cats have a morally important interest 
in sexual activity or procreation. It is possible that animals “en-
joy sexual congress as much as we do” (Rollin 2006, 305) and 
that they would derive satisfaction from the process of produc-
ing offspring (Palmer 2006, 576).  My account leaves open the 
possibility that cats have a serious, but non-basic, interest in not 
being spayed/neutered. All that is claimed is that this interest 
is not basic, and thus it is less weighty than basic interests, like 
the interest in avoiding unrelenting pain and suffering or the 
interest in remaining alive. 
But even though the right not to be spayed/neutered is non-
basic, TNR programs ought to employ less invasive or less 
aggressive sterilization methods, if they are available. Some 
animal ethicists speculate that there are sterilization options 
that allow some animals to retain their drive for sex, if they do 
have one at all. For instance, Rollin proposes that we use vace-
tomies to sterilize male cats instead of castration (2006, 305), 
and Pierce suggests that we opt for tubal ligation or ovariecto-
mies to sterilize female cats, which involves the removal of just 
the ovaries, instead of ovariohysterectomies, which involves 
the removal of both the ovaries and uterus (2016, 156). As Rol-
lin rightly argues, we ought to do what we can to minimize 
the potential harm that animals face when we forcibly sterilize 
them. One virtue of Boonin’s article is that it, too, challenges 
the unquestioned view that no costs are imposed upon animals 
who are spayed/neutered. As Pierce remarks “there is a ten-
dency to oversimplify the issue of spay/neuter and to promote 
the essential benefits without recognizing that our animals do 
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suffer some harm…we owe it to them to acknowledge their 
losses” (2016, 158). Likewise, I recognize that even though 
forcible sterilization can be justified under certain conditions, 
this does not imply that all sterilization procedures are permis-
sible. Surely respect for our feline neighbors requires that we 
sterilize them in the least harmful way possible and that we 
dedicate time and energy to exploring ways in which this may 
be accomplished. 
Implications for Biomedical Research
If TNR programs are justified, does it follow that it is per-
missible to perform biomedical research on animals, if the re-
search is aimed at preventing serious harm to humans? Regan 
himself claims that rational humans are harmed more by death 
than other animals, thus we might conclude, as Gary Varner 
does, that “if we knew by performing fatal research on a given 
number of animals we could save even one human life, then the 
worse-off principle would apply, and it would require us to per-
form the research” (1994, 27). After all, one might argue, the 
“lesser” harm caused by animal research is done in the name of 
preventing greater harm to humans. 
As I indicated earlier in this article, even when granting the 
claim that the goal of biomedical research is to promote the ba-
sic interests of humans, most research on animals still violates 
the respect principle. There are morally salient differences be-
tween the harm produced by spaying/neutering and the harm 
produced by biomedical research on animals. To state the ob-
vious, most biomedical research thwarts the basic interests of 
laboratory animals, as these animals are subject to perpetual 
injuries to and assaults on their bodies, permanent confine-
ment, and often death. And, as Aaltola notes, “[s]ince most 
animal experimentation involves much more extreme suffer-
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ing than what human beings would have to undergo when ill…
much of it would lack justification even when aimed at serv-
ing primary [or basic] human interests” (2012, 113). Moreover, 
laboratory animals are treated not just as resources for us, but 
as renewable resources (Regan 2003, 97). As Regan writes, 
“animals used in research are routinely, systematically treated 
as if their value is reducible to their usefulness to others, they 
are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect; 
thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated” (Regan 
2003, 97). Regan points out that animals in laboratories are 
treated with a lack of respect because, in virtue of just being 
produced in and confined to the laboratory, they have had their 
rights violated (Regan 1983, xxx). 
On the other hand, as I’ve argued, spaying/neutering ani-
mals does not thwart their basic interests. While animals are 
harmed non-trivially when they undergo a spay/neuter proce-
dure, this harm is not one that impairs their abilities to realize 
their fundamental goods of life, liberty, and physical security. 
Moreover, as previously argued, felines who are spayed/neu-
tered by TNR programs are not treated as renewable resources, 
nor are they treated as resources for us. Finally, as I argued 
earlier, most cats in the feline “lifeboat” are not there because 
their rights have been violated.
Nevertheless, there may be some unusual or exceptional 
cases of animal experimentation that arguably are justified on 
my interpretation of the rights view. For example, consider the 
case of Pain Experiment:
Pain Experiment: A scientist breaks into a local aquar-
ium to rescue the fish who are confined there for hu-
man entertainment. Before releasing the fish into the 
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ocean, he brings them to his home and injects the fish 
with bee venom to see if they will react in a way that 
demonstrates that they are sentient. While the bee ven-
om does cause mild pain to the fish, the pain only lasts 
for a moment. The scientist conducts this experiment 
with the aim of influencing others to refrain from ex-
ploiting fish. The scientist suspects that he would have 
better data if he performed excruciatingly painful ex-
periments on the fish, but he chooses not to because he 
believes that would be an unjust way to treat the fish. 
After all, even the fish who are exploited by humans 
do not suffer as badly as the fish in his home would 
suffer if he were to inflict such excruciating pain upon 
them. After the scientist conducts this short experi-
ment, he releases the fish into the ocean so they can 
live out their lives with their conspecifics, and he then 
publishes a research article on fish sentience. 
In Pain Experiment, as in the case of spaying/neutering, the 
harm the fish endure does not impair their ability to function in 
a minimally adequate way. Moreover, the harm the fish endure 
is caused in the name of basic interests or fundamental goods 
of other fish. It can even be argued that the fish in this scenario 
ended up in the scientist’s home not because of a rights viola-
tion. The fish end up in this prevention case situation because 
the scientist rescued the fish from an unjust situation. Keeping 
with the logic of what has been argued in this essay, the philos-
ophy of animal rights is not committed to the position that it is 
impermissible to perform experiments like “pain experiment.” 
After all, the scientist in “pain experiment” does not treat the 
fish as if they are merely useful; rather, by acknowledging that 
there is a limit to how much pain can be imposed upon the fish 
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and that it is his duty to eventually free the fish, he recognizes 
that the fish are valuable in themselves.
The use of this example is meant to illustrate that in only 
very limited, exceptional circumstance, can biomedical re-
search on animals be justified on the philosophy of animal 
rights. As Regan (1985, 24) rightly declares, “[l]ab animals are 
not our tasters; we are not their kings.” The standard type of 
animal research that is conducted in laboratories today, on the 
rights view, violates the rights of the animals, which cannot 
be justified through the use of “life-boat” ethics. And this is a 
commitment to which the philosophy of animal rights proudly, 
and rightly, endorses. 
Conclusion
The claim that the philosophy of animal rights categorically 
forbids moral agents from causing harm to some in order to 
prevent harm to others contravenes the worse-off principle, 
which advises that, in prevention cases, it is obligatory to cause 
harm to some in order to prevent greater harms to others. Yet, 
despite that the rights view, under certain conditions, sanctions 
the causing of some harms in the name of basic, fundamental 
goods, it recognizes that there is a limit to how much harm we 
can inflict upon an individual with inherent value. And when 
we accept that there is a limit to how much harm we can inflict 
upon an individual, we recognize the inherent value of the indi-
vidual. Indeed, we do not treat or view the individual as dispos-
able. Rather, we acknowledge that there is value that exists over 
and above the experiences of individuals and the utility indi-
viduals provide to others. By recognizing that certain tradeoffs 
are impermissible, such as trade-offs that involve sacrificing 
someone’s basic rights or interests for the non-basic rights or 
interests of others, regardless of the good consequences that 
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might be produced by these trade-offs, the philosophy of ani-
mal rights renounces the Utilitarian view that individuals can 
be treated like mere receptacles. Even though the philosophy 
of animal rights allows, under certain conditions, the harming 
of some in order to prevent greater harm to others, it always 
affirms that experiencing subjects-of-a-life are to be regarded 
as having value above and beyond their usefulness to others. 
Indeed, we can, and do, spay/neuter cats while acknowledging 
that they have value in their own right.
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